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Abstract
During the development of the security subsystem of modern information systems, a problem
of the joint implementation of several access control models arises quite often. Traditionally, a
request for the user’s access to resources is granted in case of simultaneous access permission by
all active security policies. When there is a conflict between the decisions of the security policies,
the issue of granting access remains open. The proposed method of combining multiple security
policies is based on the decision support algorithms and provides a response to the access
request, even in case of various decisions of active security policies. To construct combining
algorithm we determine a number of weight coefficients, use a weighted sum of the clearance
levels of individual security policies and apply the analytic hierarchy process. The weight
coefficients are adjustable parameters of the algorithm and allow administrator to manage the
impact of the various security rules flexibly.
Keywords: Security policy, combining, clearance level.
1 Introduction
The problem of combining different security policies arises quite often in the administration of
computer systems. For example, consider a database management system based on Windows
family of operating systems. A role-based security policy is the most common in the database
management systems, but the data is stored in files, access to which is controlled by the
operating system. A discretionary security policy is basic for the operating systems, but at
a certain level, a mandatory security policy is realized. Thus, conjugation of three different
security policies is required.
If we consider the different standards of information security in automated systems, we
could see that they also imply the existence of more than one security policy.
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The possibility of combining discretionary and mandatory security policies is provided in
the vast amount of information security standards. According to the Orange Book, a computer
system using only discretionary access control belongs to one of the division C classes, while
the addition of mandatory security policy allows it to qualify for a higher class of division B.
Moreover, the Orange Book implies precisely the addition of mandatory security policy with
retention of discretionary security policy capabilities.
The standard approach is to find a perfect solution so that the settings of one security policy
do not conflict with other security policies. To date, there exists a number of different solution.
In [1] the expansion of discretionary Take-Grant model, taking into account the mechanism
of mandatory access control, is considered. The article [2] proposed a universal language that
allows to describe and implement a global integrated security policy for the system, consisting
of a variety of IT environments, each has its own security model and management domain. This
language is implemented by the event monitor. Resolving conflicts between the security policies
is realized by an explicit call of the administrator for the adoption of the priority solution. In
[3] the authors proposed to extend the security matrix of discretionary security policy to the
security cube that in addition to traditional subjects and objects has a third dimension - users
or groups of users. This additional dimension allows organizing a mechanism of group access
control while remaining within the discretionary security policy. The paper [4] is devoted to the
joint implementation of the role-based and the mandatory access control concepts. Theoretical-
graph approach to the security lattice of the mandatory security policy allows combining the
requirements of the role-based and the mandatory models for digraph of entities of computer
system. The principal possibility of creating a security policy, which includes a mandatory
and a role-based access control, is shown. The paper [5] presents a model of access control for
working with XML-documents. This model combines the advantages of the role-based and the
mandatory access control policies. In particular, it is proposed to use not access control lists
but an approach based on security labels to determine the access rights.
However, there is a fundamental problem of the ideal approach realization consisting in the
absence of evidence that there is a perfect solution. Moreover, the practical realization of the
simultaneous administration of multiple security policies shows that it is not always possible
to make adjustments to ensure the proper functioning of the system.
This article deals with a new approach in combining multiple security policies in a single
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computer system based on decision algorithms.
2 Statement of the problem and a common approach to
the solution
Let us consider a system in which both discretionary and mandatory security policies are im-
plemented. According to conventional wisdom, which was embodied in virtually all information
security standards, the mandatory security policy provides a high level of information protection
and dominate the discretionary security policy that provides a basic level of data protection.
When there is a conflict between the two settings of security policies, two approaches are used
traditionally. According to the first approach, access is denied if it is prohibited at least by one
security policy. In the second case, the mandatory security policy dominates, and the decision
about access permission is received based on its settings. The first approach can easily lead to
the complete failure of the system, the second approach virtually shut down discretionary secu-
rity policy. Furthermore, the mandatory security policy is focused on the overall system. The
administrator defines the security labels of system subjects and objects that can be changed
only by changing the state of the system as a whole but not in a particular access. However,
exceptions are possible. For example, the administrator need to allow access of a specific sub-
ject to a specific object, contrary to the mandatory security policy. The administrator monitors
the contents of the object and can guarantee no leakage of information through the subject,
but cannot guarantee no leakage through other subjects with the same level of access. This
permission may be implemented with the introduction of some additional security labels for
each case, which leads to a significant increase and entanglement of the security lattice and,
consequently, to the complexity of system administration. Another approach is to use discre-
tionary security policy, which in one case should dominate the mandatory security policy. In
other words, the superstructure can be implemented in the system, and it will decide on the
dominance of a particular security policy in each case.
We formulate the statement of the problem more strictly. Let the two security policies
operate in the system and take decisions based on P1 and P2 algorithms. It is necessary to
implement the algorithm P for taking a decision about what kind of security policy will be used
for each request for access. It should be noted that using the algorithm P is really needed only
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when the decisions of P1 and P2 are contradictory.
Traditionally, within the security policy, a decision taken on the access request is the value
from the set {0, 1}, where zero corresponds to an access denial, and one corresponds to an
access permission. To make a decision about accessibility we extend the range of the algorithm
values to the set {−m, ...,−1, 0, 1, ..., m} where m is the positive integer. The values of this
range is called the clearance level, it is denoted by the letter p. Access is granted if p > 0. The
clearance level refers to the probability of information leakage for a given access:
P (p) = 0.5−
p
2m
.
The higher is the clearance level, the higher is the level of confidence in access. With this
approach, algorithm P takes a decision based on the clearance levels of individual security
policies p1 and p2.
Consider a system in which security policy P1 dominates security policy P2. We introduce
the dominance coefficient r, showing how many times the decision taken by P1 is more important
than the decision taken by P2. In this case, the final decision can be calculated as a weighted
sum of the decisions of the two security policies:
p =
r
r + 1
p1 +
1
r + 1
p2.
Equivalence of the security policies is achieved with r = 1. Access is granted if p > 0. Note
that p is not necessarily an integer: p ∈ [−m,m].
3 The combination of the mandatory and discretionary
security policies
We consider the most common case of combining the mandatory and discretionary security
policies. For the mandatory security policy, we restrict ourselves to the simplest case of a linear
security lattice with l levels of security. In this case, the clearance level can be found as the
difference between the level of confidence of the subject C(S) and the level of secrecy of the
object C(O):
p1 = (C(S)− C(O))
m
l
.
For the discretionary security policy, the clearance level can be arbitrarily set by the adminis-
trator for each access. If the administrator wants to set a top priority for the access, he appoints
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p2 = m. Therefore, only the case of appointment of the default clearance level is consider. We
assume that the total number of possible types of access equal to M . Let the subject requests
access to the object for several types of access. In case of access denial, we assume that
p2 = −k
m
M
,
where k is the number of denied accesses from the list of requested accesses. If access is granted,
then let
p2 = h
m
M
,
where h is the number of granted but not requested types of access.
Example 1. Consider the model example of such a system. Suppose that the mandatory
security policy is based on a linear security lattice with four levels L = {0, 1, 2, 3}. For dis-
cretionary security policy, we assume that four types of access are defined: R = {r, w, a, f}.
Suppose that at some point in time a request for access (s, o, r) is received, which has the
corresponding cell M [s, o] = {r, w, a} in the access matrix, the level of secrecy of the object is
C(o) = 2, the level of confidence of the subject is C(s) = 1. In this case, p1 = C(s)−C(o) = −1,
p2 = 2. When security policies are equal, then p = (p1 + p2)/2 = 1.5 > 0, i.e. access is granted
despite the prohibition of the mandatory security policy. If we increase the priority of the
mandatory security policy 3 times, then:
p =
3
4
· (−1) +
1
4
· 2 = −
1
4
< 0.
In this case, access is denied.
4 Nonlinear security lattice
When combining the mandatory and the discretionary security policies, we considered the
simplest case of a linear security lattice with L levels of security. However, in real systems,
the mandatory security policy can be set by nonlinear security lattice, i.e. a variety of security
labels will be partially ordered. With this approach to the implementation of security policies,
the level of confidence of the subject C(S) and the level of secrecy of the object C(O) may
be incomparable. In this case, it is impossible to define the clearance level as the difference
between the level of confidence of the subject C(S) and the level of secrecy of the object C(O).
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This means that we need a different approach to determining the clearance level given by the
mandatory security policy.
The classical model of mandatory security policy defines an operator that specifies for each
pair of elements l1 and l2 from the basic set of security levels L a single element of the least
upper bound:
sup(l1, l2) = l ⇔ (l1, l2 ≤ l) ∧ (∀l
′ ∈ L : (l′ ≤ l)⇒ (l′ ≤ l1 ∨ l
′ ≤ l2)).
We introduce the operator dif(l1, sup(l1, l2)) showing the ”distance” from the security level l1
to the least upper bound of the security levels l1, l2:
dif(l1, sup(l1, l2)) = sup(l1, l2)− l1.
This approach is possible because the lattice elements l1 and sup(l1, l2) are by definition always
comparable. This operator allows determining the number of levels of the security lattice from
element l1 to sup(l1, l2). Note that this value is always non-negative.
We determine the clearance level p1 for incomparable in the lattice level of confidence of the
subject C(S) and the level of secrecy of the object C(O) as a negative modulus of the difference
of distances between the levels C(S) and C(O) and the least upper bound sup(C(S), C(O)):
p1 = −|dif(C(S), sup(C(S), C(O)))− dif(C(O), sup(C(S), C(O)))|
m
L
.
If the level of confidence of the subject C(S) and the level of secrecy of the object C(O) are
incomparable, access is not granted, so the value should be negative. In this case, because the
difference of ”distances” between the levels of the lattice is defined, the absolute value of the
difference is calculated.
Example 2. Consider the model example of such a system. Suppose that the mandatory se-
curity policy is based on a nonlinear security lattice with eight levels L = 0, 1a, 1b, 1c, 2ab, 2c, 3, 4.
In addition, 0 ≤ 1a, 0 ≤ 1b, 0 ≤ 1c and levels 1a, 1b, 1c are incomparable, 1a ≤ 2ab, 1b ≤ 2ab,
1c ≤ 2c and levels 2ab, 2c are incomparable. Also 2ab ≤ 3, 2c ≤ 3, 3 ≤ 4. For discre-
tionary security policy, we assume that four types of access are defined: R = {r, w, a, f}.
Suppose that at some point in time a request for access (s, o, r) is received, which has the
corresponding cell M [s, o] = {r, w, a} in the access matrix, the level of secrecy of the object is
C(o) = 1c, the level of confidence of the subject is C(s) = 2ab. In this case, sup(C(s), C(o)) = 3,
diff(C(s), sup(C(s), C(o))) = 1, diff(C(o), sup(C(s), C(o))) = 2. Hence p1 = −1 × |1− 2| =
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−1 and p2 = 2. When security policies are equal, then p = p1 + p2 = 1 > 0, i.e. access is
granted despite the prohibition of the mandatory security policy. If we increase the priority of
the mandatory security policy 3 times, then:
p =
3
4
· (−1) +
1
4
· 2 = −
1
4
< 0.
In this case, access is denied.
5 Application of the analytic hierarchy process
Two mandatory and two discretionary security policies often operate in the same system: one is
related to confidentiality, the other is related to integrity. In this case, to calculate the clearance
level it is more convenient to use the analytic hierarchy process with decision tree shown in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: The decision tree for calculating the clearance level p
It is necessary to fill three pairwise comparison matrices: one is for the level of criteria and
two are for the level of alternatives. Suppose, as before, r (r > 0) is the dominance coeffi-
cient, showing how many times the decision taken by the mandatory security policy (MSP)
is more important than the decision of the discretionary security policy (DSP). Preference for
the confidentiality policy over the integrity policy is evaluated by two similar parameters: r1
(r1 > 0) for the discretionary model, r2 (r2 > 0) for the mandatory model. Then the pairwise
comparison matrices are given in table:
p DSP MSP
DSP 1 1/r
MSP r 1
DSP int. conf.
int. 1 1/r1
conf. r1 1
MSP int. conf.
int. 1 1/r2
conf. r2 1
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The ideal consistency of these matrices comes from the fact that for two-dimensional recip-
rocal matrix M there always is the condition: ∀i, j, k comes the equation [M ]ij = [M ]ik× [M ]kj .
In this case, the relative weight coefficients are determined by the normalized columns (for ex-
ample, the first) of all three pairwise comparison matrices, and the formulas for calculating the
relative priorities of the integrity policy and the confidentiality policy have the following forms:
Rint =
1
1 + r1
·
1
1 + r
+
1
1 + r2
·
r
1 + r
, Rconf =
r1
1 + r1
·
1
1 + r
+
r2
1 + r2
·
r
1 + r
= 1−Rint.
The final decision on granting the access can now be calculated according to the formulas:
p = Rint · pint +Rconf · pconf .
pint =
1
1 + r
· pintDSP +
r
1 + r
· pintMSP , p
conf =
1
1 + r
· pconfDSP +
r
1 + r
· pconfMSP .
where the superscript denotes the confidentiality policy or the integrity policy, and the subscript
denotes the discretionary access control or the mandatory access control. Analyzing the given
formulas, we can draw the following conclusions:
1. Since Rint and Rconf belong to the range (0, 1), then using the analytic hierarchy process
in case pint and pconf have the same sign will not change the decision of granting the access.
2. If r1 ≥ 1 and r2 ≥ 1, then R
int ≤ Rconf . If r1 < 1 and r2 < 1, then R
int > Rconf . In both
cases, the analytic hierarchy process formulas can be replaced by the formula
p =
1
1 + r′
· pint +
r′
1 + r′
· pconf ,
where r′ is the parameter characterizing how many times the decision taken by the confiden-
tiality policy is more important than the integrity policy decision.
3. Application of the analytic hierarchy process gives the most interesting results in case
pconf and pint have different signs and ((r1 > 1) ∧ (r2 < 1)) ∨ ((r1 < 1) ∧ (r2 > 1)).
Access will be granted and the integrity policy will receive the priority.
Consider the other embodiment of a decision tree. Suppose the system still has two pairs
of security policies. Now we consider the decision tree of the analytic hierarchy process shown
in Figure 2.
Let the decision taken by the confidentiality policy x times more important than the in-
tegrity policy decision. Preference for the mandatory access control model over the discretionary
access control model is evaluated by two parameters: x1 for the integrity policy, x2 for the con-
fidentiality policy. Then the pairwise comparison matrices are given in table:
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Figure 2: The decision tree for calculating the clearance level f
F Int. Conf.
Int. 1 1/x
Conf. x 1
int. DSP MSP
DSP 1 1/x1
MSP x1 1
conf. DSP MSP
DSP 1 1/x2
MSP x2 1
The formulas for calculating the relative priorities of the integrity policy and the confiden-
tiality policy have the following forms:
XDSP =
1
1 + x1
·
1
1 + x
+
1
1 + x2
·
x
1 + x
, XMSP =
x1
1 + x1
·
1
1 + x
+
x2
1 + x2
·
x
1 + x
= 1−XDSP .
The final decision on granting the access can now be calculated according to the formulas:
f = XDSP · fDSP +XMSP · fMSP .
fDSP =
1
1 + x
pintDSP +
x
1 + x
pconfDSP , fMSP =
1
1 + x
pintMSP +
x
1 + x
pconfMSP .
where the superscript denotes the confidentiality policy or the integrity policy, and the subscript
denotes the discretionary access control or the mandatory access control. It is not difficult to
prove the following statement.
Statement 1. If r = x1 = x2 and r1 = r2 = x, then p = f .
Thus, in case of equality of priorities in the context of the selected access control model and
in the context of confidentiality and integrity policies, both approaches to the construction of
decision tree of the analytic hierarchy process lead to the same clearance level.
6 Conclusion
The proposed approach to the construction of a joint security policy has several advantages
compared to the traditional requirement of simultaneous access permission by all active security
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policies. The presence of the weight coefficients allows the administrator to configure the degree
of influence of various security rules flexibly. Using two different types of security policies make
sense if they cover the different channels of information leakage. Therefore, the choice of the
weight coefficients in the decision algorithm must be based on analysis of the probability of
different attacks.
It should be noted that the need for a decision on the dominance of one security policy over
another arises only in case of conflict of permissions for the same access request. On the one
hand, in systems, which allow a consistent security administration, such conflicts do not arise.
On the other hand, if the two security policies never have a conflict, then one of the security
policies can be disabled without affecting the security of the system.
The proposed approach can be applied in the design of the additional information security
systems, as well as in software systems with their own security subsystem.
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